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The Regulation and Removal of
Nonconforming Uses
James A. Young
BACKGROUND
Constitutionality of Comprehensive Zoning
Municipal zoning, which has been defined as "the districting of muni-
cipalities on the basis of one or both of (a) nature and extent of use, and
(b) architectural and structural requirements,"1 is a relatively new con-
cept in the United States. Although many cities had, prior to the enact-
ment of comprehensive zoning ordinances, regulated the height of build-
ings, the use of limited areas for certain trades considered to be offensive,
and the spacing of buildings,
THE AUTHoR (A.B., 1954, Ohio Wesleyan, when municipalities attempted
MA., 1958, George Washington, LLB., 1960, to exclude all trades or busi-
Western Reserve) is a practicing attorney in nesses from residential districts,
Cleveland, Ohio. there were many who ques-
tioned the constitutionality of
such legislative action.3
Any fears as to the validity of comprehensive zoning were put to rest
by the land-mark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,4
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1926. In this case, the
Village of Euclid, Ohio, had zoned for residential use only an area where-
in the Ambler Realty Company owned land. The realty company argued
that such zoning was unreasonable and arbitrary in that the industrial de-
velopment of Cleveland had reached the village limits and, thus, the
natural and most economical use of the land would be for commercial
purposes. In holding that the village had the power to divert the "natural
expansion" of such land in order to protect the residential users thereof
and that the zoning ordinance could not be said to be so clearly unreason-
able and arbitrary as to have no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, the Court firmly established the con-
stitutionality of the principle of comprehensive zoning.5 The Court ob-
1. 1 ANTImAU, MUNiaPAL COR'ORATION LAw § 7.00 (1958).
2. See 8 McQuILLIN, MuNIclPAL CORPORA&TioNs § 25.01 (3d ed. rev. 1957); 1 MA'zsN-
BAUM, LAW OF ZONING 1-11 (2d ed. 1955).
3. See Pontiac Imp. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922);
Lucas v. State, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 363 (Ct. App. 1923).
4. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
5. Prior to the Ambler Realty Co. case, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio
St. 628, 149 NE. 30 (1925), held that comprehensive zoning was a valid exercise of the
police power reasonably related to the preservation of public health and welfare, and that it
did not constitute a taking of property without compensation. On the same day, the court
held that an ordinance which purported to limit the use of only a small portion of land within
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served that while constitutional guarantees are invariable, the scope of
their application is sufficiently elastic to meet new and changing condi-
tions. The Supreme Court also stated that if the validity of the legisla-
tive classification under the zoning ordinance is clearly debatable, the
judgment of the legislature, as reflected by their enactment, must pre-
vail.'
While the constitutionality of the general principle of comprehensive
zoning is beyond question, the legality of certain types of enactments is
still open to question,' as is the application of the zoning ordinance to a
specific piece of property.'
Ohio Municipalities' Authority to Zone
Article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution provides that:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general law.
the municipal limits was not a proper exercise of the police power either with respect to zoning
generally, or with respect to the police power as it related to the ability to remove a nuisance.
The court found that apartments were not a nuisance per se in an area zoned for single family
residences and, thus, the exercise could not be sustained on that ground either. City of Youngs-
town v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925).
The correct interpretation of these two cases was given in State ex rel. Srigley v. Wood-
worth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (1929), wherein the court stated that considering
the cases together, it seemed that "the Supreme Court sustained a comprehensive city-wide
ordinance which prohibits the construction of an apartment building within a residential dis-
trict, and refuses to sustain an ordinance containing a like exclusion where only a part of the
city is zoned unless it can be shown that the block ordinance prevents the erection of a build-
ing that would be a nuisance or a place for carrying on a business that would be a nuisance."
1d. at 409, 169 N.E. at 714.
6. "If the municipal council deemed any of the reasons which have been suggested, or any
other substantial reason, a suffident reason for adopting the ordinance in question, it is not
the province of the courts to take issue with the council. We have nothing to do with the
question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances. If they are not satisfactory
to a majority of the citizens, their recourse is to the ballot - not to the courts." Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393 (1926).
7. For example, the following types of zoning have been held to be invalid: spot zoning
(City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925);
Cassel v. Lexington Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 163 Ohio St. 340, 127 N.E.2d 11
(1955)); zoning based upon a consideration of supply and demand of the type of business for
-which the owner wanted to use his particular lot (Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258,
appeal dismissed, 162 Ohio St. 280, 122 N.E.2d 792 (1954)); arbitrary zoning, such as zon-
ing an area for residential purposes where the district was in the middle of the heavy indus-
trial area and part was used as a dump (Loesch Allotment Co. v. Village of Newburg Heights,
100 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio C.P. 1950)), where billboards could not be erected within village
limits, when it was zoned for industrial use (Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of
Evendale, 124 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio C.P. 1954) ), or where district is zoned for single family use
when located on main thoroughfare and in commercial area (State ex rel. Stine v. Village of
Brook Park, 107 Ohio App. 325, 153 N.E.2d 677 (1958); State ex rel. DiCarlo v. Gallo, 80
Ohio L. Abs. 355 (Ct. App. 1957) ); aesthetic zoning (Wondrak v. Kelley, 129 Ohio St. 268,
195 N.E. 65 (1935); State ex tel. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713
(1929)).
8. State ex rel. Killeen Realty Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 375, 160 N.E.2d
1 (1959); Curtiss v. City of Cleveland, 166 Ohio St. 509, 144 N.E.2d 177 (1957); White
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Inasmuch as a zoning ordinance is a police regulation, this provision is
self-executing with respect to zoning and, hence, municipal corporations
are able to enact zoning laws without the aid of state enabling statutes.'
While the state legislature has not enacted zoning regulations as such, it
has passed statutes which purportedly give municipalities the power to
zone1' and which purport to set forth the procedure which must be fol-
lowed by municipalities when enacting such measures." The code also
provides that:
Sections 713.06 to 713.12, inclusive, of the Revised Code do not
repeal, reduce, or modify any power granted by law or charter to any
municipal corporation or the legislative authority thereof, or impair or
restrict the power of any municipal corporation under Article XVIII
of the Ohio Constitution....1
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that this section "yields unre-
stricted power to municipalities in respect to zoning, if such powers are
granted by the municipal charter."' 3  Thus, since the constitution gives
municipalities the power to adopt police regulations "not in conflict with
general law," and the "general law" authorizes the municipalities to exer-
cise unrestricted power with respect to zoning if their charter so provides,
there can be no conflict between the two. 4 Under this view it would
appear that the state statutes relating to zoning are completely superfluous
with respect to charter municipalities. 5 Only if the General Assembly
should enact substantive zoning regulations of general application and
only if the municipal zoning ordinance should conflict with such state
statutes, would the state enactment have the effect of limiting the charter-
municipality's power to zone."
Since zoning legislation is an exercise of the power to adopt police
regulations, it is subject to the limitation inherent in all ordinances
founded upon such basis, i.e., its exercise must be reasonably related to
v. City of Cincinnati, 101 Ohio App. 160, 138 N.E.2d 412 (1956); State ex rel. Rosenthal
v. Bedford, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 425 (Ct. App. 1956); State ex tel. Euverard v. Miller, 98 Ohio
App. 283, 129 N.E.2d 209 (1954); State ex rel. Gaddis v. City of Oakwood, 49 N.E.2d 956
(Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
9. Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
10. OHIo REv. CODE § 713.06.
11. OtoI REV. CODE § 713.12.
12. OHio REV. CODE § 713.14 (Supp. 1960).
13. Bauman v. State ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio St. 270, 171 N.E. 336 (1930).
14. Ibid.
15. State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 252, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941),
noted this distinction. In Morris v. Roseman, 118 N.F2d 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954), the
court held that the non-charter municipality could likewise disregard the state statutes pur-
porting to lay down rules with respect to the procedure for passing a zoning ordinance. How-
ever, this case was reversed. 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N.X.2d 419 (1954).
16. It is urged that the same rule applies to non-charter municipalities also. For a further
discussion of this point see notes 64-68 infra and accompanying text.
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the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."r In addition, since
zoning is a limitation on an individual's right to use his property as he
sees fit, zoning laws must be such that the good to the public outweighs
the detriment to the individual's rights.18 In accordance with the princi-
ple set forth in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, the courts
are prone to abide by the judgment of the legislative body in this respect
if the question is at all debatable."
Uses Not Complying with Zoning Ordinance
Because of the harsh nature of zoning ordinances as applied to cer-
tain pieces of property, provision is usually made to allow within a dis-
trict uses other than those specifically set forth. These variations from
the zoning law differ in nature, and the distinction is of vital importance
in determining the power of a municipality to remove nonconforming
uses. Therefore, the classification of noncomplying uses will be set forth
briefly.
Exceptions
Many times the municipal zoning ordinance specifically allows a
property owner to use his property in a manner other than that provided
for in a given district if certain stated conditions exist. This type of use
is called an exception. In the strict sense of the word, this is not a non-
complying use because such use is provided for in the ordinance. The
validity of such exceptions is generally recognized. "0
Variances
The legislation adopting a plan of zoning usually provides that a
board or an official shall hear requests by property owners to use their
land in a manner which does not conform to the use provided for in that
district. If permission is granted, it is called a variance. Although the
granting of such variances is not particularly favored by many courts,2
17. Village of University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th
Cit. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 569 (1927).
18. Curtiss v. City of Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959) (syllabus 4).
19. For example, see State ex rel. Associated Land & Inv. Corp. v. City of Lyndhurst, 168
Ohio St. 289, 154 N.E.2d 435 (1958), wherein the court said that a legislative determination
that traffic conditions in the municipality warranted the inclusion of a requirement that build-
ings generating traffic provide off-street parking would not be disturbed.
This idea was also expressed in Pritz v. Messer, wherein Judge Allen said: "The courts
in such cases have no right to determine whether the measures questioned are wise or the best
that might have been adopted. The courts cannot hold such laws invalid upon the mere ground
of inexpediency. In other words, the question of the reasonableness of this ordinance is one,
in the first instance, for the determination of the council which enacted it." 112 Ohio St.
628, 639, 149 N.E. 30, 35 (1925). See also Francisco v. City of Columbus, 31 N.E.2d 236
(Ohio Ct. App. 1937), appeal dismissed, 134 Ohio St. 526 (1938).
20. See 1 ATmuAu, MuNicIPAL CORPORATiON LAW § 7.08 (1958).
21. But see State ex rel. Killeen Realty Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 375, 160
N.E.2d 1 (1959).
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the general principle of allowing variances under a zoning ordinance is
unquestionably valid.22
A variance is to be distinguished from an exception in that the body
delegated to pass upon applications for the former has discretionary power
to grant or to deny such use as a departure from the precise regulations
for a given zone. It is in the nature of an equitable proceeding. Excep-
tions, on the other hand, are uses other than those prescribed for a par-
ticular use district, but they come into operation when certain statutory
conditions exist, and, thus, are actually conforming uses within the broad
wording of the ordinance.
Nonconforming Uses
A use of property in existence on the effective date of a municipal
zoning ordinance, which use does not comply with the statute, is called a
nonconforming use. It is generally considered that an ordinance which
attempts to eliminate such nonconforming use is unconstitutional on the
basis that it is a taking of property without due process of law. A
municipality's zoning law, in order to avoid this potential pitfall of un-
constitutionality, will ordinarily make provision for the continuation of
such nonconforming uses. The degree to which such nonconforming uses
may be regulated will be considered in detail in subsequent sections.2 4
It should be noted that the nonconforming use differs from an excep-
tion and a variance in that the nonconforming use comes into being sole-
ly by virtue of its existence at the time the zoning ordinance became ef-
fective, whereas the exception and the variance are noncomplying uses
which may arise after the ordinance has been in effect. Furthermore,
since under most ordinances the right to continue a nonconforming use
arises by virtue of its prior existence, it is in no way dependent upon a
grant by some municipal body.
Accessory Uses
An accessory use is one which, although not sanctioned by the letter
of the zoning ordinance, is nevertheless allowed to be carried on because
it is incident to a conforming use. For example, it has been held that
having a dance studio in a home is a proper accessory use in an area zoned
for residential purposes only.m
22. Furthermore, if a business is permitted to operate as a variance, the municipality can
reasonably restrict the days of operation of the business. State ex rel. 12501 Superior Corp.
v. East Cleveland, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 177 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
23. State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941).
24. See notes 26-75 infra and accompanying text.
25. Stewart v. Humphries, 132 N.E.2d 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955). The court held that
the accessory use was permissible since it came within a city zoning ordinance which allowed
accessory uses only if the business did not occupy more than twenty-five per cent of the lot area.
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The basic distinction between an accessory use and the other three
noncomplying uses mentioned above is that the accessory use is one per-
mitted in conjunction with a conforming use of property, whereas the
other three involve the use of property primarily for a noncomplying
purpose.
REGULATION OF NONCONFORMING USES
Nonconforming uses, like common-law marriages, are not favorites
of the law. Upon reflection, the reason for their disfavored position be-
comes clear: if the segregation of buildings and uses, which is the func-
tion of zoning, is valid because of the beneficial results which this brings
to the community, to the extent that such segregation is not carried out,
the value of zoning is diminished and the public is thereby harmed. As
previously noted, nonconforming uses are allowed to exist merely because
of the harshness of, and the supposed constitutional prohibition against,
the immediate termination of a use which was legal when the zoning
ordinance was enacted. However,
* . . the rights contemplated by zoning measures to continue noncon-
forming uses are not perpetual easements. They are not like the rights
of patentees to exclude the world from the use of inventions even though
the patentees themselves make no use thereof.26
Rather, the rights of a nonconforming user are limited, and the dear in-
tent and purpose is to eliminate such nonconforming uses as rapidly as
possible.27 With this in mind, the courts have generally recognized the
right of a municipality strictly to regulate these nonconforming uses.
The Requirement of Actual Use
Since the protection afforded is based upon the concept that an exist-
ing legal use should not be denied a property owner by the enactment of
a zoning ordinance, there must usually be an actual nonconforming use in
existence on the effective date of the ordinance in order to come within
the protection of this rule. The mere contemplation of using the prop-
erty in a nonconforming manner will not be sufficient,28 nor will a non-
conforming use prior to the enactment of the ordinance, but not in ex-
istence on the effective date of the ordinance, qualify. 9 Furthermore, the
26. 8 MCQULLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.183 (3d ed. rev. 1957).
27. Curtiss v. City of Cleveland, 166 Ohio St. 509, 144 N.E.2d 177 (1957).
28. Ohio State Students Trailer Park Cooperative v. County of Franklin, 123 N.E.2d 542
(Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
29. See State ex rel. Turner v. Baumhauer, 234 Ala. 286, 174 So. 514 (1937); City of
Everett v. Capitol Motor Transp. Co., 330 Mass. 417, 144 N.E.2d 547 (1953); Whitpain
Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509, 94 A.2d 737 (1953). Also, a use established after the
effective date of the ordinance will not give rise to a protected nonconforming use. Applica-
tion of Hepner, 152 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1956).
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property owner dearly has the burden of proving that the alleged non-
conforming use existed30
Possession of a Permit and "Actual Use"
In most municipalities today, a property owner must obtain a build-
ing permit from the municipal authorities before he may proceed to erect
a structure on his property. Whether or not an Ohio municipal corpora-
tion may, if it so desires, prohibit the construction of a nonconforming
building subsequent to the effective date of the zoning ordinance when a
permit has been issued prior to such date, is not dear.
In State ex rel. Fairmount Center Company v. Arnold,3 there was
dictum in the supreme court's opinion indicating that a municipality
could not make its zoning ordinance apply to buildings for which permits
had been issued prior to the effective date of the ordinance, even though
the permit holder had incurred no expense in reliance upon the permit.
However, in Williams v. Village of Deer Park," a court of appeals held
that a zoning ordinance could be applied to prohibit the construction of
a building for which a permit had been issued prior to the ordinance's
effective date, provided that the property owner had not incurred large
expenses nor proceeded to any considerable degree in the erection of the
building in reliance upon the permit. In another case m a second court
of appeals held that a permit issued after the adoption of a zoning ordi-
nance but before the effective date of the ordinance could be revoked.
Subsequently, the supreme court, in Smith v. juillerat,"4 held that the
fact that money had been expended for preliminary work in connection
with the construction of a nonconforming use did not in itself create a
nonconforming use when the property was not substantially in use in a
nonconforming manner on the effective date of the ordinance. In a later
appellate case, however, it was held that where the owner of property had
spent over twenty thousand dollars for preliminary plans, excavation, and
partial construction, he could not be denied the right to proceed with the
construction of a nonconforming trailer park for which he had obtained
a permit.85
30. Reilly v. Conti, 93 Ohio App. 188, 112 N.E.2d 558 (1952), aff'd, 158 Ohio St. 232,
108 N.E.2d 281 (1952).
31. 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941).
32. 78 Ohio App. 231, 69 N.E.2d 536 (1946). The court placed great reliance upon State
ex rel. Bolce v. Hauser, 111 Ohio St. 402, 145 N.E. 851 (1924), wherein the court, passing
upon the right of a municipality to exempt from the operation of its ordinance those who had
applied for a building permit, proceeded upon the theory that municipalities could have in-
cluded the permit holders within the statute. See also Hauser v. State ex rel. Erdman, 113 Ohio
St. 662, 150 N.E. 42 (1925); Meuser v. Smith, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 161 (C.P. 1955).
33. Cahn v. Guion, 27 Ohio App. 141, 160 NE. 868 (1927).
34. 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611 (1954).
35. Kessler v. Smith, 104 Ohio App. 213, 142 NE.2d 231 (1957), motion to certify denied,
1961]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The waters were further muddied by the recent Curtiss v. City of
Cleveland series of cases.86 Here, capital had been expended and im-
provements had been made upon property zoned for commercial use. The
property was subsequently zoned for limited residential use. In urging
that the amendments to the ordinance were unconstitutional, the plaintiff
contended that he was entitled to rely upon the original ordinance, with-
out amendments which would materially increase the restrictions on the
use of the land. While the effect of a previously issued permit was not
the direct question in issue, the possibility of acquiring a right to a non-
conforming use through substantial investments made with respect to a
contemplated use of property was involved. When the issue came before
the Ohio Supreme Court in 1957, the court, in essence, held that if sub-
stantial use had not been made of the property, a nonconforming use was
not established.!7 When the case was again before the supreme court in
1959, the majority held that the application of the amended ordinance
constituted an unconstitutional taking of property. In a very unsatisfac-
tory opinion, the court did not state that a substantial investment created
a right to use property in a nonconforming manner;"8 however, this
theory could be inferred from the court's holding that the amended ordi-
nance was unconstitutional.
In view of the above cases, the law is dearly unsettled in Ohio with
respect to the relationship between building permits and nonconforming
uses. Other states have held that the issuance of a building permit prior
to the effective date of a zoning ordinance does not prevent the operation
of a zoning ordinance with respect to that property. It would seem that
the same rule should prevail in Ohio, in view of the nature of the non-
conforming use and the policy of strictly regulating them.8" At least, a
municipality should not be precluded from preventing the protection of
a nonconforming use when there has been no substantial investment and
partial construction or use of the property in a nonconforming manner.
It must be remembered that if a permit were deemed to confer no right
to a nonconforming use, the permit holder could still apply for a variance
and, if the facts dearly substantiated the justice of his claim, such a vari-
ance could then be granted.
Oct. 30, 1957. This case could be interpreted as turning upon the validity of the ordinance
as applied, rather than generally.
36. 130 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), reversed and remanded, 166 Ohio St. 509, 144
N.E.2d 177 (1957), on remand, 146 N.X.2d 323 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), modified and af.
firmed, 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959).
37. 166 Ohio St. 509, 144 N.E.2d 177 (1957) (syllabus 3).
38. 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959).
39. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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A Nonconforming Use May Not Be Extended
As has been indicated, the right to continue a nonconforming use is
recognized in order to allow a person to use his property in the same man-
ner as it was used prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance. With
this in mind, it is generally recognized that a municipality can restrict, or
completely prohibit, the extension of a nonconforming use. This posi-
tion is buttressed by the policy that nonconforming uses are to be elimi-
nated as rapidly as possible. Thus, if a nonconforming business establish-
ment in a residential district is precluded from expanding such use to new
properties, the owner may well be forced to give up the use and move his
business to a district zoned for such use.
In line with this thinking, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State ex rel.
City Ice & Fuel Company v. Stegner," specifically held that a zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting the extension of a nonconforming use, unless approved
by the zoning board of appeals, was valid. Similarly, in Davis v. Miller,41
it was held that where a person owned two lots separated by a street, and
a nonconforming use had been established on the one lot, the owner could
not extend the use to the other piece of property, even though such exten-
sion had been contemplated at the time that the zoning ordinance was
adopted.
Termination of a Nonconforming Use
A second method of regulating nonconforming uses is to provide that
once such use has been terminated or ended, it may not be restored. There
are four recognized methods by which a termination of a nonconforming
use may be effected: abandonment, non-use or discontinuance, voluntary
destruction, and involuntary destruction. While the courts do not always
keep these distinctions dear, there is some basis for the categorization.
Abandonment
A leading case in the United States said that the requirements for
abandonment are two-fold: an intention to abandon and an overt act, or
failure to act, 'which carries the implication that the owner neither claims
nor retains any interest in the subject matter of the abandonment."' If
there is a distinction between non-use and abandonment, this definition
would seem to be improper. An abandonment, properly speaking, takes
place when the property is used in a manner which manifestly denies the
claim of a nonconforming use. Thus, where a nonconforming piece of
40. 120 Ohio St. 418, 166 NE. 226 (1929). See also McLandish v. Maumee, 7 Ohio L
Abs. 453 (Ct. App. 1929).
41. 163 Ohio St. 91, 126 N.X.2d 49 (1955).
42. Landay v. Zoning Appeal Board, 173 Md. 460, 470, 196 At!. 293, 297 (1938).
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property has been used for some time in a conforming manner, the non-
conforming use has been terminated through an abandonment.43
Discontinuance or Non-User
Distinguished from termination by abandonment, which requires an
affirmative act, is termination by discontinuance or non-user, which arises
through the absence of an overt act. In order for the latter rule to come
into operation, there must be a cessation of the nonconforming use for a
stated period of time. Ordinances which provide for the termination of
a nonconforming use by non-user have been upheld in Ohio."'
It should be noted that the temporary non-use of the property in a
nonconforming manner will not result in a termination. Further, it is
in connection with this type of termination that "intent" may become
relevant. That is, if the ordinance does not state a period of non-use
which will terminate the right to a nonconforming use, then the intent to
discontinue such use is material. However, ordinances which state that
a given period of non-use in a nonconforming manner will work a termi-
nation have been upheld.
Voluntary Destruction
Another manner in which a termination may occur is in the case of
the removal or destruction of a prior nonconforming use. In State ex rel.
Cataland v. Birk,45 it was held that where a person tore down a noncon-
forming garage, a new one could not be constructed on the same founda-
tion. This would seem to be a just decision in view of the extraordinary
nature of the right to continue a nonconforming use. If such complete
reconstruction of the nonconforming use were allowed, such nonconform-
ing use could go on indefinitely.
Involuntary Destruction
Although there are apparently no cases in Ohio directly decided upon
this point, it would seem that the municipality could also provide that a
nonconforming use which has been destroyed by fire, flood, or other
natural forces would be a termination of the nonconforming use and,
hence, no right would exist for its reconstruction.46 The rationale for
43. Termination by abandonment ordinances have been upheld in Ohio. See Curtiss v. City
of Cleveland, 166 Ohio St. 509, 144 N.E.2d 177 (1957); Francisco v. City of Columbus, 31
N.E.2d 236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937), appeal dismissed, 134 Ohio St. 526 (1938).
44. In fact, such ordinances are now authorized by state statute. Owo REV. CODE § 713.15
(Supp. 1960).
45. 125 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
46. Such an ordinance was upheld in D'Agostine v. Jaguar Realty Co., 22 NJ. Super. 74,
91 A.2d 500 (1952).
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this view is that the right to continue a nonconforming use is based upon
the concept that one should not be deprived of a substantial investment
which existed prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance. However,
when a building has been destroyed, the reason for allowing the continu-
ation of a prior nonconforming use is not applicable to the reconstruction
of the nonconforming use. The investment required to rebuild will be
substantially the same, regardless of whether the structure is built in a
conforming or a nonconforming manner. Hence, there exists no reason
to allow the continuation of this exceptional use.
If, however, the nonconformity is in the use made of the property,
rather than in the type of structure involved, 7 the reason for requiring
compliance with the zoning laws is less persuasive. Under such circum-
stances, it is no longer a matter of whether the owner can rebuild a struc-
ture similar to that which had previously existed or whether he must build
a structure in conformity with the zoning requirements; rather, the issue
now becomes whether the owner will be permitted to use the property at
all for the same purpose as before the destruction, or whether he will be
required to acquire a new piece of property in order to carry on the de-
sired activity. While the reasoning requiring compliance is less persua-
sive in this situation, it still has validity. When a person acquires a lot
in a certain area with the idea of locating a factory thereon and, before
construction, the area is zoned for residential use only, the owner may
constitutionally be required to purchase a new piece of property to carry
out such project. The nonconforming user whose factory has been de-
stroyed by fire is, in essence, in the same position as the individual who,
prior to the enactment of the zoning law, purchased land with the idea of
building a factory thereon. Since the refusal to allow the construction
of the contemplated building in violation of the zoning ordinance is con-
stitutional, it would seem that one desiring to rebuild a factory could be
similarly restrained. 8
Degree of Destruction
If the building is less than completely destroyed, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, there may be a closer question as to the right of a munici-
pality to consider this to be a termination of the nonconforming use.
However, ordinances from other jurisdictions dispensing with a noncon-
forming use have been upheld when the building has been destroyed in
large part,"' seventy-five per cent destroyed,5" and when the building has
47. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
48. The analogy is less persuasive when applied to the rebuilding of a commercial business
which depends upon personal contact in the neighborhood in which it is situated.
49. E.g., Appeal of Berberian, 351 Pa. 475, 41 A.2d 670 (1945).
50. Navin v. Early, 56 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1945).
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been destroyed in excess of fifty per cent of value and sixty per cent of
physical proportion.5  Also, the first Curtiss v. City of Cleveland case52
said that an ordinance which provided that:
... Repairs to building . . . after damage thereto shall not exceed 50
per cent of the valuation of such building unless it is changed to a con-
forming use, constitutes a valid exercise of the police power of the
municipality.53
By clear implication, an ordinance which prohibited the restoration of a
nonconforming building after less than total destruction would be valid.
Substitution of Nonconforming Uses
Another method of regulating a nonconforming use is by refusing to
allow a property owner to substitute one nonconforming use for another.
In State ex rel. Clifton-Highland Company v. City of Lakewood,' the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the city could refuse to permit the property
owner to substitute a new nonconforming use for an existing noncon-
forming use. In the Stegner case,55 the court upheld such a regulation
even though that ordinance prohibited the substitution of a use of greater
conformity than the prior nonconforming use5
In view of the above decisions, it would seem to be logically dear that
if a property owner substitutes one nonconforming use for another, he
has terminated his right to claim any nonconforming use." Such a posi-
tion is also supported by the general policy relating to nonconforming
uses - only uses existing on the effective date of the ordinance are pro-
tected, and even these uses are to be terminated as rapidly as possible. In
effect, then, the substitution of nonconforming uses is actually a termina-
tion of the prior nonconforming use through abandonment."8
Protection of Nonconforming Uses
Although disfavored by the law, nonconforming users are not com-
pletely without protection. Thus, it is clear that the property and build-
51. Baird v. Bradley, 109 Cal. App. 2d 365, 240 P.2d 1016 (1952).
52. 166 Ohio St. 509, 144 N.E.2d 177 (1957).
53. Id. at syllabus 1.
54. 124 Ohio St. 399, 178 N.E. 837 (1931).
55. 120 Ohio St. 418, 166 N.E. 226 (1929).
56. The ordinance under consideration in the Stegner case did permit the property owner of
a nonconforming use to appeal to the zoning board of appeals for an extension or a substitu-
tion of his nonconforming use, but not both.
57. Other jurisdictions have so held. See Dorman v. Baltimore, 187 Md. 678, 51 A.2d 658
(1947); see also Town of Darien v. Webb, 115 Conn. 581, 162 Ad. 690 (1932) (when non-
conforming use replaced by other uses, some conforming and others nonconforming, it was
held to be an abandonment of the nonconforming use); and Branch v. Powers, 210 Ark. 836,
197 S.W.2d 928 (1946) (court would not permit a nonconforming use to be substituted for
a conforming use).
58. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
[September
NONCONFORING USES
ings may be maintained and repaired. The usual qualification found in
enabling ordinances is that work may be done on a building so long as it
does not amount to a "structural alteration." 9 Also, it is dear that the
mere conveyance of property to another person should not constitute an
abandonment of a nonconforming use,6" nor should the leasing of prop-
erty constitute an abandonment.6 With respect to alterations, what con-
stitutes a "structural alteration" within the meaning of the ordinance is a
question of fact.62
Section 713.15 and Nonconforming Uses
In 1957, the Ohio General Assembly amended the portion of the
code relating to zoning to provide as follows:
The lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and of any
land or premises, as existing and lawful at the time of enacting a zon-
ing ordinance or amendment thereto, may be continued, although such
use does not conform with the provisions of such ordinance or amend-
ment; but if any such nonconforming use is voluntarily discontinued for
two years or more, any future use of such land shall be in conformity
with sections 713.01 to 713.15, inclusive, of the Revised Code. The
legislative authority of a municipal corporation shall provide in any
zoning ordinance for the completion, restoration, reconstruction, exten-
sion or substitution of nonconforming uses upon such reasonable terms
as are set forth in the zoning ordinance.tu
The precise purpose of this section of the Code is not dear, nor is the
validity of this amendment free from doubt.
As has been noted, 4 under the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio
Constitution a municipality has the power to enact such police regula-
tions "as are not in conflict with general law." In order for a conflict to
exist within the meaning of this provision, there must be a police regula-
tion which prescribes a rule of conduct for all the citizens of the state,
regardless of the political subdivision wherein they reside.66 Thus, a
law of general application which attempts to limit the right of a munci-
pality to perform functions rightly belonging to it is not, under the bet-
ter view, a "general law" within the purview of article XVII, section 3
59. See State ex rel. Euclid-Doan Bldg. Co. v. Cunningham, 97 Ohio St. 130, 119 N.E. 361
(1918); 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.201 (3d ed. rev. 1957).
60. O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949); Elsinor Property
Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Morwand Homes, Inc., 286 App. Div. 1105, 146 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1955).
61. Dube v. Allman, 333 Ill. App. 538, 77 NE.2d 855 (1948).
62. See 1 ANTmAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw 5 7.07 (1958). Frequently, the or-
dinance will include percentage limitations with respect to what constitutes a "structural
change."
63. OtIO REV. CODE § 713.15 (Supp. 1960).
64. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
65. Owo CONST. art XVIII, § 3.
66. Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 NE. 512 (1913).
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of the Ohio Constitution. This thesis, strongly urged by Ellis, 7 is but-
tressed by the fact that the debates of the constitutional convention"
reveal that the purpose of the "conflict" provision was to insure the
uniform application of state police regulations throughout the state,
regardless of the political subdivisions, and not to limit the power of a
municipal corporation to enact police measures.69
If the above interpretation of the Home Rule Amendment is accepted,
then section 713.15 would be invalid, and municipalities would be free
to establish their own rules with regard to nonconforming uses and the
termination thereof. However, even if this section is valid, its effect
would appear to be very limited in scope. Essentially, section 713.15 has
three provisions: (1) nonconforming uses must be recognized and pro-
tected; (2) if a nonconforming use is "voluntarily discontinued" for
two or more years, it may not be restored; and (3) municipalities must
provide for the completion, restoration, reconstruction, extension, or sub-
stitution of nonconforming uses "upon reasonable terms." Examining
each provision, it seems that only the second one is of significance under
the present status of zoning law.
With respect to the first provision, under the overwhelming ma-
jority view, a prior nonconforming use must be allowed to continue, or
else the ordinance runs afoul of the federal constitution."° The third
provision is also nothing but a restatement of the existing law. That is,
inasmuch as the right to zone is based upon the police power of the
municipality, all ordinances, including those relating to nonconforming
uses, must meet the test of "reasonableness" in order to be a valid exercise
of that power.7' Hence, only the second provision is controversial.
It should be noted that the Code says that a termination of a noncon-
forming use will occur if such use is "voluntarily discontinued" for two
years or more. Remembering that a termination by discontinuance is one
which relates to a non-user,72 the only effect of this part of the Code is to
provide a two-year standard to be applied in place of any other standard
that a municipality might have with respect to termination through non-
67. ELLIS, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN OHIO § 1.30 (10th ed. Farrell 1955).
68. Constitutional Convention of 1912.
69. See City of Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929); City of
Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
70. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. It has been held, and properly so, that a ter-
mination cannot occur by a city taking a portion of the nonconforming premises. 440 East
102d St. Corp. v. Murlock, 285 N.Y. 298, 34 N.E.2d 329 (1941); Empire City Racing Ass'n
v. City of Yonkers, 230 N.Y. Supp. 457, 132 Misc. 816 (1928); Beck v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment, 69 Pa. D. & C. 438 (1949). The same result has been reached where part of
the nonconforming land was taken by the state through condemnation proceedings. Connor
v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
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user. Although it is not clear whether the legislature intended to use the
word "discontinued" in its technical sense, it is urged that such an inter-
pretation is the proper one. Conceding for the moment that it is desira-
ble to protect persons from losing the right to a nonconforming use
through the temporary non-use of property, it would seem that no such
need exists where the owner abandons this use."3 By the same token,
one who tears down a nonconforming structure needs no such protec-
tion.74 While a more difficult question is presented where the structure
is destroyed by some involuntary act, the better view would uphold the
right of a municipality to forbid absolutely the reconstruction of the non-
conforming use, rather than be bound by the statutory two year limita-
tion.7" This interpretation, which would limit the second provision to
cases of termination by non-user, is supported by the fact that to hold
otherwise would be to give a forced meaning to the word "discontinue,"
and by the fact that the restoration or the reconstruction of nonconform-
ing uses (which relate to the abandonment or the destruction of non-
conforming uses, respectively) is covered by the third provision of
713.15, thereby excluding it from the second provision. The net result
is that even if section 713.15 is valid, its scope is extremely limited.7"
TERMINATION OF NONCONFORMING USES
Retroactive Application of Ordinances
The overwhelming majority view in the United States today is that a
zoning ordinance which makes no provision for the continuation of a
prior nonconforming use is unconstitutional.77 This has also been the
view of the Ohio courts.78 However, there are some cases which indi-
cate that it would not be unconstitutional to prohibit all nonconforming
uses as long as the benefit to the public is not dearly outweighed by the
harm to the property owner.
73. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
76. The only case which has interpreted this section has been Curtiss v. City of Cleveland,
146 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). The court found that the amending ordinance, which
provided that nonconforming uses could not be substituted or changed except by permission
and at the discretion of the Board of Zoning Appeals, was invalid as being in conflict with
section 713.15. This interpretation would seem to be clearly erroneous. The supreme court
did not consider this point because it was not included in the journal entry of the court of
appeals. 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959).
77. See Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal. 2d 341, 115 P.2d 455 (1941); Douglas v. Village of
Melrose Park, 389 II1. 98, 58 N.X.2d 864 (1945); Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245
Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86 (1928); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Garden City, 85 Misc. 508, 57
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1945); City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759
(1953).
78. State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941);
City of Toledo v. Miller, 106 Ohio App. 290, 154 N.2d 169 (1957).
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Thus, in New York, the Court of Appeals upheld a zoning ordinance
which prohibited nonconforming uses. The court stated that the en-
forcement of a zoning regulation against prior nonconforming uses will
be valid "where the resulting loss to the owner is relatively slight and
insubstantial."79  Florida80 and Louisiana 8 have also upheld retroactive
zoning laws.
The retroactive application of zoning laws, while shocking at first
blush, is not entirely void of merit. All zoning laws are a restriction
upon the right of an individual to use his property as he sees fit. How-
ever, the mere restriction of this right has not been deemed sufficient to
strike down the zoning ordinances to date. Rather, they have been up-
held on the basis that under the police power the restriction is reasona-
ble. While "reasonableness" is a nebulous term, some definiteness can
be given to it by weighing the private interest restricted and the public
benefit contemplated by the regulation. Thus, if the nonconforming use
is that of keeping goats in one's yard, it would appear that the public
benefit to be derived from removing such use would justify the refusal
to recognize the nonconforming use, and still meet the test of "reasonable-
ness." In other cases, where a large financial investment is at stake,
even if the right to continue a use were not automatically granted under
the nonconforming use doctrine, such use could be continued by means
of an exception or a variance. The net result of the retroactive applica-
tion of zoning laws then would be to eliminate the myriad of small, but
bothersome, nonconforming uses presently protected. At the same time,
the individual property owner would still have an opportunity to request
special consideration in those cases where the zoning law would work a
truly disproportionate hardship.
The flaw in this argument is that (1) the right to protection would
in most cases be dependent upon the dollar value of the use in question,
and (2) the large nonconforming uses, which are the ones that are most
detrimental to the public, would in all probability be the uses that would
be allowed to continue.
Amortization of Nonconforming Uses
A less drastic, but nonetheless effective manner of terminating non-
conforming uses is to provide that such uses must be eliminated within
a certain period of time, or at the end of the estimated useful life of the
79. People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 108, 106 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1952). See also People v.
Kesbec, Inc., 281 N.Y. 785, 24 NE.2d 476 (1939).
80. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 P.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950); State ex rel.
Skilman v. City of Miami, 101 Pa. 585, 134 So. 541 (1931).
81. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929), cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So.
314 (1929).
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structure. This method of resolving the conflict between the munici-
pality and the property owner is growing in popularity." The decisions
in a number of states, especially the liberal states of New York and Cali-
fornia, indicate that this type of ordinance will be upheld against the
contention that it amounts to an unconstitutional taking of property
without due process of law.'a A California appellate court sustained an
ordinance requiring the termination of a nonconforming use within five
years after the enactment of the zoning law;84 the California Supreme
Court, in dictum, said that such an ordinance did not amount to a taking
of property and that as long as the amortization period was reasonable,
"a legislative body may well conclude that the beneficial effect on the
community... by a reasonable amortization plan more than offsets in-
dividual losses";es and the New York Court of Appeals, in remanding a
case for further facts, said that "we cannot say that a legislative body may
not in any case, after a consideration of the factors involved, conclude
that the termination of a use after a period of time sufficient to allow
a property owner an opportunity to amortize his investment and make
other plans is a valid method of solving the problem." 6
Ohio has not yet passed upon a plan of this type. In Akron v. Chap-
man," the Ohio Supreme Court did hold unconstitutional an Akron
ordinance which authorized the city council to require the termination of
a nonconforming use when, in the opinion of the council, such noncon-
forming use had existed for a "reasonable" period of time. However,
this case should not be deemed to settle the question of whether an or-
dinance which requires the termination of a nonconforming use within
a stated reasonable time, or within the useful life of the property, would
be constitutional.
In the Chapman case, the owner had used the property in the same
manner since 1916 and had acquired a nonconforming use upon the
passage of the zoning ordinance in 1922. Then, in January of 1950, the
council said that Chapman's property, and only his, had been used in a
nonconforming manner for a reasonable period of time and they directed
82. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 73-1 (1945); KANSAS GEN. STAT. § 19-2919;
VmGINIA CODE ANNO. § 15-843 (1950).
83. See City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954) (ordinance
requiring termination of nonconforming use within five years sustained); Livingston Rock &
Gravel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954) (dictum); Harbison
v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 76 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958). See also Grant v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957) (ordinance requiring removal of
bilboards, which were nonconforming uses in residential zones, within five years of enact-
ment); Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957).
84. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
85. Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954)
(dictum).
86. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 562, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 607 (1958).
87. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.X.2d 697 (1953).
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that such use terminate by January 1, 1951. Under these circumstances,
it is little wonder that the court held Chapman had been deprived of his
property rights in an unconstitutional manner.
Perhaps a hint of the court's attitude toward an ordinance requiring
the elimination of a nonconforming use may be gleaned from its state-
ment that such a law might be sustained if it were based upon the "grad-
ual elimination of nonconforming uses within a zoned area."8  The
court qualified this statement by adding that such action could be taken
only where it would not deprive the owner of a "vested property right."
The court went on to define such right as
... not merely the ownership and possession of lands or chattels but
the unrestricted right to their use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything
which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys
the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If
the right of use is denied, the value of the property is annihilated and
ownership is rendered a barren right.89
It is submitted that this definition of "property" is too broad. While
the above-quoted passage may properly describe the incidents of owner-
ship, it is not an accurate statement of the property rights which are pro-
tected against invasion from any source. If the court's definition cor-
rectly described the property rights which are absolutely inviolate, then
all zoning laws would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, if this
definition is to be used only with respect to prior nonconforming uses,
then the property rights connected with nonconforming uses must, of
necessity, be of a higher order than any other property rights. That
would seem to be as incomprehensible as it would be unjustifiable.
In view of the fact situation in the Chapman case, the limitations in-
herent in the court's definition of property rights, and the hint that the
"gradual" elimination of nonconforming uses might be valid, it seems
fair to conclude that Ohio has not yet passed upon the validity of an
ordinance which would require the amortization of a nonconforming use
over a reasonable period of time.
Use of Eminent Domain
Another possible method of terminating nonconforming uses is
through the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Although a few
states have authorized such action, 0 the constitutionality of this method
of removing nonconforming uses is not entirely dear, at least in Ohio.
While eminent domain does provide compensation for the dispossessed
property owner, there would appear to be some question as to whether
88. 1d. at 386, 116 N.E.2d at 699.
89. Id. at 388, 116 N.E.2d at 700.
90. E.g., MICHIGAN STAT. ANNo. § 5.2933(1); MINNESOTA STAT. ANNO. § 462.12.
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this would be an expenditure for a public purpose, as required." Ohio
has not yet passed upon the use of such power as a method of terminating
nonconforming uses; however, the use of eminent domain for purposes
of urban redevelopment has been upheld.92 These holdings might be
deemed to be sufficiently analagous to lend support to the proposition
that eminent domain is available to Ohio municipalities as a method of
removing nonconforming uses.
Because of the red-tape and the expense involved in this type of
proceeding, municipalities may not feel that this is a very valuable tool
in effecting the purposes of zoning.?'
Nuisances
Finally, a municipality dearly has the right under its police power
to compel the termination of a nonconforming use when it constitutes a
nuisance."4 Although there is no indication that this method has been
widely used in Ohio, its potential value should not be overlooked.
Whether an ordinance which creates a presumption of a nuisance when
a nonconforming use has been partially or totally destroyed or when a
nonconforming use has been in existence a certain number of years
would stand up under constitutional scrutiny is rather doubtful. It is
clear that an activity cannot simply be declared by ordinance to be a
nuisance and its removal thereby compelled.95 Rather, the activity must be
a nuisance per se before it can be treated in so arbitrary a manner. 6
However, as the courts become more convinced of the public value de-
rived from zoning and the deleterious effects which can flow from con-
tinued nonconforming uses, it is not inconceivable that they would in
some future year uphold an ordinance which makes a nonconforming
use a statutory nuisance after it has been in existence a certain number
of years.
91. The requirement of a public purpose is requisite for any expenditure of taxpayers'
money.
92. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
93. However, some municipal corporation authorities favor this method of removing non-
conforming uses. See 1 ANTMAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW 5 7.07 (1958).
94. Baird v. Bradley, 109 Cal. App. 2d 365, 240 P.2d 1016 (1952); Perkins v. City of
Coral Gables, 57 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952). It should be noted that an illegal use cannot give
rise to a protected nonconforming use. Gross v. Allan, 57 N.J. Super. 262, 117 A.2d 275
(1955). See also Village of Warrensville Heights v. Cleveland Raceways, Inc., 161 Ohio St.
592, 120 N.E.2d 305 (1954), dismissing appeal from 73 Ohio L. Abs. 318 (Ct. App.).
95. Bane v. Township of Pontiac, 343 Mich. 481, 72 N.W.2d 134 (1955); Keenly v. Mc-
Catty, 137 Misc. 524, 244 N.Y.S. 63 (1930). Ohio has held that a municipality cannot
completely prohibit a legal business merely by calling it a nuisance. See Simon v. City of
Cleveland Heights, 46 Ohio App. 234, 188 N.E. 308 (1933); Wolarz v. Village of Cuyahoga
Heights, 53 Ohio App. 161, 4 NB.2d 400 (1936). A fortiori, a legal, existing nonconform-
ing use could not be terminated merely by classifying it as a nuisance.
96. But see Hadachek v. City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
1961]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Zoning is an offspring of urgent urban necessity. Without doubt,
sound comprehensive zoning not only contributes but is essential to
public health, safety and welfare. Moreover, it is economically de-
sirable and necessary, since it results in the most appropriate and eco-
nomic use of land within the municipal area.9 7
Accepting this as the starting point, it cannot be doubted that non-
conforming uses vitiate the value of zoning ordinances. Although it was
once thought that the restrictions placed upon the nonconforming use
of land and buildings would lead to their early demise, experience has
shown that quite often the opposite is true. Nonconforming uses which
are profitable to the property owner will not be voluntarily terminated.
Rather, owners will ding to their monopolistic position as long as possi-
ble. With this realization in mind, many states have taken steps to
hasten the day of bringing all uses within a district to a conforming
status. While some of the measures used to accomplish this result are
harsh, it is submitted that the ordinances requiring the amortization of
a nonconforming use over a reasonable period of time are both constitu-
tionally and equitably sound. This does not constitute a taking of prop-
erty, because the owner is given a reasonable period to amortize his in-
vestment and make other plans. Furthermore, it is a reasonable exercise
of police power since such removal of the nonconforming use has a real
relationship to the public health, safety and morals. At the same time
it is just, in that the property owner is not deprived of the use of his prop-
erty immediately upon the passage of a zoning ordinance, nor is he al-
lowed perpetually to reap the benefits of a windfall arising from his
existing location and the prohibition against similar types of businesses
coming into his district.
The use of land has become so critical today that municipalities can
no longer sit idly by awaiting the day when the nonconforming user will
voluntarily give up his gold mine. Because of this urgency, and keeping
in mind the factors set forth above, it is to be hoped that if an amortiza-
tion ordinance comes before the Ohio Supreme Court, it will not strike
down the ordinance on the basis of the Chapman case, but will take
cognizance of the above considerations and uphold the ordinance as a
valid exercise of the municipality's police power.
97. 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.02, at 13 (3d ed. rev. 1957).
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